Les droits de l'homme sont un ensemble normatif qui donne à tout être humain des droits universels et inaliénables, malgré les différences religieuse, raciale, ethnique ou nationale. Ces droits sont reconnus aux hommes au-delà des droits positifs des différents Etats. De manière fondamentale, ils sont une garantie contre l'exercice arbitraire du pouvoir. Ils sont la réaffirmation forte de l'égalité et de la liberté sans lesquelles on ne peut construire une société démocratique et forte. Malgré cette posture, les droits de l'homme (...) se retrouvent en quête de sens. Le présent ouvrage propose de voir les inflexions des droits de l'homme face au pouvoir des nouvelles puissances, face à la plénitude de l'Etat-nation de façon générale, mais principalement face à l'Etat-africain. Comment, à partir des critiques d'Edmond Burke, de Karl Marx et d'Hannah Arendt, penser la réalité des droits de l'homme? Quel commerce ces trois grands penseurs des droits de l'homme entretiennent-ils. [Source : 4e p. de couverture]. (shrink)

Deux œuvres africaines par Werewere Liking et Manuna Ma Njock s’inspirent des mythes d’Orphée pour présenter le rituel de guérison employé en Afrique. Il s’agit de la pièce du théâtre-rituel de Manuna Ma Njock, Orphée d’Afrique, et du roman de Werewere Liking, Orphée dAfric. Les poètes nous présentent la catabase orphique en forme de rêve et du rite de guérison. Werewere Liking s’inspire également de Thot-Hermès Trismégiste, l’homologue égyptien de Merlin. Orphée dans la pièce de Ma Njock doit parcourir les (...) neuf étapes de l’initiation qui évoquent les grades de lames du Tarot. Dans le roman de Werewere Liking, Orphée commence sa catabase après la noyade de sa femme, Nyango, qu’il doit retrouver dans le monde souterrain. Le chiffre neuf dans les deux ouvrages est employé comme symbole de la fin de l’initiation, voire l’individuation. (shrink)

La louve n’est pas seulement associée à la violence et à la terreur mais elle évoque également l’image de la mère nourricière et protectrice comme dans les légendes de Rémus et Romulus et de saint Ailbhe. Dans les deux légendes, des héros allaités par une louve grandissent pour devenir fondateurs : Rome pour Rémus et Romulus et le diocèse d’Emly pour saint Ailbhe. La louve est aussi liée à la débauche et à la luxure, et le bordel est nommé lupanar (...) en latin. The she-wolf is not only associated with violence and terror, but also evokes the image of a protective, nurturing mother as in the legends of Remus and Romulus as well as Saint Ailbhe. In the two legends referred to, namely that of the Roman heroes who became the founder of Rome, as well as that of Saint Ailbhe, founder of the diocese of Emly, both the Roman twins and Saint Ailbhe were suckled by a she-wolf. The she-wolf is also associated with debauchery and concupiscence and the whorehouse is called lupanar in Latin. (shrink)

Cet article recense et présente brièvement les recherches et publications sociologiques francophones les plus récentes consacrées aux rapports entre genre et musique selon trois grandes thématiques : celle de la création musicale au féminin, celle de la condition des musiciennes, et celle de la voix des femmes qui, plus étoffée, est également abordée sous l’angle des disciplines anthropologique et musicologique. Chacune de ces thématiques est traversée par la question des enjeux symboliques des catégories de sexe et leur lecture sociohistorique.

Ensemble d’articles et de comptes rendus de tables rondes, cet ouvrage est le fruit d’un colloque organisé par l’IRCAM, l’occasion d’une rencontre entre chercheurs et musiciennes. De nombreux sujets sont abordés dans cette étude pluridisciplinaire où les femmes sont replacées dans leur contexte historique, social et culturel original, et où le fait musical est entendu comme révélateur du fonctionnement d’une société. Par de multiples portes d’entrée, cette réflexion d’ensemble aborde ainsi le...

Frédéric Le Blay René Théophile Hyacinthe Laennec entreprit la traduction des Traités des maladies aiguës et des maladies chroniques du médecin romain Caelius Aurelianus. À partir de l’édition des manuscrits établie en 2009, je propose une analyse interprétative de la démarche du clinicien. Au-delà de la curiosité érudite d’un amoureux des classiques, je cherche à montrer que l’exercice de lecture et de traduction des textes constitutifs d’une histoire de la clinique s’intègre dans la méthode de Laennec et contribue à fonder (...) son épistémologie médicale, à une époque où les pratiques sont soumises à des redéfinitions majeures. Une telle entreprise, qui fait du texte, constituant d’une littérature, une donnée d’expérience en vue du diagnostic, n’est pas sans présenter quelque analogie avec certaines orientations contemporaines. (shrink)

South Africa has the highest rate of foetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) in the world. The problem of alcohol abuse in pregnancy has very deep historical roots that are intertwined with the injustices of both apartheid and pre-apartheid colonialism. Much of the research that is being done in these communities is focused on identifying the epidemiological variables associated with these patterns of alcohol abuse. The underlying reasons as to why these patterns continue seem to remain largely obscured from view. In this (...) article, I apply the theory proposed by Powers and Faden of social justice as a ‘moral foundation for public health and health policy’ to the problem of FAS in South Africa. The objective of this application is two-fold: first, to critically explore the additional insights and alternative perspectives to the problem of FAS that this approach may provide and second, to assess the utility of the theory when applied directly to a specific public health problem. I conclude by noting that although this approach could result in the kind of ‘public health scope creep’ that has been criticized by various authors, it does provide fresh insights to the problem of FAS in South Africa. (shrink)

An adequate conjunction-implication pair is given for complete orthomodular lattices. The resulting conjunction is noncommutative in nature. We use the well-known lattice of closed subspaces of a Hilbert space, to give physical meaning to the given lattice operation.

The interventionist account of causal explanation, in the version presented by Jim Woodward, has been recently claimed capable of buttressing the widely felt—though poorly understood—hunch that high-level, relatively abstract explanations, of the sort provided by sciences like biology, psychology and economics, are in some cases explanatorily optimal. It is the aim of this paper to show that this is mistaken. Due to a lack of effective constraints on the causal variables at the heart of the interventionist causal-explanatory scheme, as presently (...) formulated it is either unable to prefer high-level explanations to low, or systematically overshoots, recommending explanations at so high of a level as to be virtually vacuous. (shrink)

This study examines a recurrent scenario in Roman poetry of the first-person genres: the separation of the poet from his writing tablets. Catullus' tablets are stolen ; Propertius' are lost ; Ovid's are consigned to disuse and decay by their disappointed owner. Martial, who does not reproduce the specific narrative of loss, nonetheless engages with the tradition of lost tablets from within the fiction of festive gift-exchange in his Apophoreta : rather than losing or rejecting the tablets, he gives them (...) away to guests/readers at his Saturnalian party. I argue that the representation of writing tablets and their loss is involved in the production of authorial presence. The scene of lost tablets demonstrates how the poet retains the capacity for poetic speech even when deprived of the aid of his material medium. The ostensibly accidental and sometimes lamented loss of the poet's tablets thus contributes to a sophisticated strategy of authorial self-representation. The tablets do not so much stand for the literary text as provide a focus for metapoetic concerns with voice and writing, author and text, presence and absence, immortal ingenium and expendable materia. Examination of the shifting representation of writing tablets from Catullus to Martial will provide insight into the invention of the Roman poetic author. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 253 Histoire de la Philosophic. Tome IV. Par Albert Rivaud. Philosophic Franqaise et Philosophic Anglaise de 1700 ~ 1830. (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1962. Coll. "Logos." Pp. xxiii + 594. NF 22.) It is a disservice to the memory of a scholar to publish his unfinished writings, though one can understand how friendship induces his colleagues and pupils to do so. In the case of the fourth volume (...) of Rivaud's Histoire de la Philosophic, the disservice is all the greater, since several chapters and parts of chapters have been written not by him but by his associates: Messrs. Rochot on Vauvenargues, Daumas on the Philosophic chimique, Leroy on British and American philosophy, while the chapter on biology after Lamarck has been left in its unfinished and fragmentary state. What Rivaud would have done with these topics cannot be determined now, but surely he would not have thought that 124 pages out of 574 would suffice for a treatment of British and American philosophy, when even such figures as Hyacinthe Bougeant, Jean-Franqois H6nault, Mercier de la Rivi~re, Paul Thiry, Marmontel, and Hemsterhuis are given at least a few paragraphs each. As far as British and American students are concerned, Book II which treats of their intellectual predecessors might well have been omitted. Not only is the treatment skimpy, but there occur from time to time errors of fact which, though perhaps trivial in themselves, shake one's faith in the historian's accuracy. To refer to but one or two examples, we are surprised to learn that the Island of Rhode Island is one of the Bermudas (p. 484), that Berkeley's two children were born in Bermuda (ibid.), that Hume never once mentioned the poems of Shakespeare or Milton (p. 512), which would seem to indicate that the author had never read Hume's History of England, and that (p. 557) John Galsworthy was a grand romancier du XIXe si~cle. Such errors are made by the best of us nor should I cast the first stone, were it not that this is the type of history of philosophy which goes in heavily for biographical detail. Each man mentioned is given a full biography, sometimes running on for pages in small print and including details which are diverting enough in themselves and which are perhaps important if they illuminate the ideas of the men whose lives they depict. But Rivaud gives one no indication of how, for instance, Rousseau's musical interests affected his philosophy, of why Grimm (p. 197) who ne s'intdresse gu~re gzla philosophic should be given even a paragraph, of what influence the various mistresses and wives of the philosophers mentioned actually had upon their lovers' ideas. A biographical history of philosophy, if done by a psychologist, might be extremely revealing of the procedures of the intellect. But these sketches which precede the expositions of philosophical theses seem irrelevant except insofar as they give us dates and education. One can understand 254 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY that Descartes' having studied with the Jesuits at LaFl~che is a useful bit of information, for it may in part explain why he refused to accept any doctrine which contradicted the teachings of the Church. But would Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion have been different if he had not had his quarrel with Rousseau? If so, to what extent? In spite of these criticisms, the book has the value of a good reference book. Not only are there copious references to the leading intellectuals of eighteenth -century France, but among them are included natural scientists who normally do not figure in histories of philosophy. Such men as Lavoisier, Buffon, Lamarck, Geoff-roy Saint-HiIaire and Cuvier were philosophical in their aims and their philosophical ideas modified their scientific investigations just as their scientific discoveries reacted upon their philosophical thinking. For that we can congratulate ourselves. It would be absurd, for instance, to omit men like Clerk Maxwell, Willard Gibbs, Einstein, Darwin, and Agassiz, Freud and Jung, L. H. Morgan, Franz Boas, and Lester Ward in an account of the role of philosophy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To the extent that Rivaud has coupled men... (shrink)

Thought experiments have played a central role in philosophical methodology, largely as a means of elucidating the nature of our concepts and the implications of our theories.1 Particular attention is given to widely shared “folk” intuitions – the basic untutored intuitions that the layperson has about philosophical questions.2 The folk intuition is meant to underlie our core metaphysical concepts, and philosophical analysis is meant to explicate or sometimes refine these naïve concepts. Consistency with the deliverances of folk intuitions is a (...) sign that the philosopher is making contact with his object of interest. In order to explore folk concepts, people are often asked to provide their intuitions about a state of affairs in some alternate universe or possible world, one that differs in particular, precise ways from the way things are in the actual world. Here we provide evidence that people’s intuitions about moral responsibility sometimes diverge across worlds even when the facts about these worlds are the same. Which world one considers actual affects at least some philosophical judgments, suggesting that it is not just possible worlds to which our intuitions are tied. We will present several possible explanations for the asymmetry we have identified, and we’ll consider some implications for philosophical intuition. (shrink)

Brain images are used both as scientific evidence and to illustrate the results of neuroimaging experiments. These images are apt to be viewed as photographs of brain activity, and in so viewing them people are prone to assume that they share the evidential characteristics of photographs. Photographs are epistemically compelling, and have a number of characteristics that underlie what I call their inferential proximity. Here I explore the aptness of the photography analogy, and argue that although neuroimaging does bear important (...) similarities to photography, the details of the generation and analysis of neuroimages significantly complicate the relation of the image to the data. Neuroimages are not inferentially proximate, but their seeming so increases the potential for misinterpretation. This suggests caution in appealing to such images in the public domain. (shrink)

Legal analysis is a task underlying many forms of legal problem solving. In the Anglo-American legal system, legal analysis is based in part on legal precedents, previously decided cases. This paper describes a reduction-graph model of legal precedents that accounts for a key characteristic of legal precedents: a precedent's relevance to subsequent cases is determined by the theory under which the precedent is decided. This paper identifies the implementation requirements for legal analysis using the reduction-graph model of legal precedents and (...) describes GREBE, a program that satisfies these requirements. (shrink)

Disorders of Consciousness (DoCs) raise difficult and complex questions about the value of life for persons with impaired consciousness, the rights of persons unable to make medical decisions, and our social, medical, and ethical obligations to patients whose personhood has frequently been challenged and neglected. Recent neuroscientific discoveries have led to enhanced understanding of the heterogeneity of these disorders, and focused renewed attention on the medical and ethical problem of misdiagnosis. -/- This book examines the entanglement of epistemic and ethical (...) uncertainty in DoCs and other medical contexts, and how they interact to create both epistemic and ethical risks. Philosopher and bioethicist L. Syd M Johnson pulls together multiple threads in this work: the ontological mysteries of consciousness, medical uncertainty about unconsciousness, ableist bias, withdrawal of treatment in neurointensive care, and the rarely questioned view that consciousness is essential to personhood and moral status. Johnson challenges longstanding bioethical dogmas about DoC patients, and argues for an ethics of uncertainty for contexts where there is a need for decisive action in the presence of unavoidable uncertainty. The ethics of uncertainty refocuses ethical inquiry concerning persons with DoCs, placing less emphasis on their contested personhood, and more on inductive risk and uncertainty, on respect for autonomy, and especially on epistemic justice. With applications to various decisional contexts where uncertainty and ethical risk interact, this ethical approach enables surrogate decision makers facing fraught and risky choices to fulfill their obligations as moral and epistemic agents. (shrink)

Moral Case Deliberations are reflective dialogues with a group of participants on their own moral dilemmas. Although MCD is successful as clinical ethics support, it also has limitations. 1. Lessons learned from individual MCDs are not shared in order to be used in other contexts 2. Moral learning stays limited to the participants of the MCD; 3. MCD requires quite some organisational effort, 4. MCD deals with one individual concrete case. It does not address other, similar cases. These limitations warrant (...) research into complementary ways of providing CES to healthcare professionals. Our research objective was therefore to develop a low threshold CES tool based on a series of MCDs on autonomy in long-term care. We used a qualitative research design in which we analyzed the process and content of a series of MCDs, combined with reflections on the theoretical background of MCD. In total 28 MCDs were analyzed by means of a thematic content analysis. In various rounds of development, the results of the analysis were combined with theoretical reflections on CES. Consequently, the tool was evaluated in three focus groups and adjusted. The CES tool, called ‘moral compass’, guides the users through a series of six subsequent questions in order to methodically reflect on their concrete moral dilemma, in the form of a booklet of 23 pages. It combines a methodical element that encourages and structures a reflection process with a substantive element, including norms, values, options, strategies, and insights regarding dealing with client autonomy. By using data from a series of MCDs, combined with theoretical reflections on MCD, ethics support and moral learning, we developed a thematic, low-threshold CES tool that supports healthcare professionals in daily practice in dealing with moral questions regarding client autonomy. It integrates examples and insights from earlier MCDs on the same topic. The moral compass is not a replacement of, but can be used complementary to MCD. The feasibility and impact of the moral compass need to be investigated in an evaluative follow-up study. The methodology presented in this paper may be used to develop moral compasses on different topics in various healthcare organizations. (shrink)

Van Orden and Paap argue that subtractive functional neuroimaging is fundamentally flawed, unfalsifiable, and cannot bear upon the nature of mind. In this they are mistaken, although their criticisms interestingly illuminate the scientific problems we confront in investigating the material basis of mind. Here, I consider the criticisms of Van Orden and Paap and discuss where they are mistaken and where justified. I then consider the picture of imaging science that Van Orden and Paap seem to espouse and sketch an (...) alternative picture that is more realistic, more interesting, and consistent with the deliverances and the weaknesses of neuroimaging techniques. Finally, I identify three assumptions that I do think neuroimaging is wedded to and briefly discuss their implications. (shrink)

In some recent papers, Max Coltheart has questioned the ability of neuroimaging techniques to tell us anything interesting about the mind and has thrown down the gauntlet before neuroimagers, challenging them to prove he is mistaken. Here I analyze Coltheart ’s challenge, show that as posed its terms are unfair, and reconstruct it so that it is addressable. I argue that, so modified, Coltheart ’s challenge is able to be met and indeed has been met. In an effort to delineate (...) the extent of neuroimaging’s ability to address Coltheart ’s concerns, I explore how different brain structure‐function relationships would constrain the ability of neuroimaging to provide insight about psychological questions. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

We have arrived at an inflection point, a moment in history when the sentience, conscious- ness, intelligence, agency, and even the moral agency of many nonhuman animals can no longer be questioned without ignoring centuries of accumulated scientific knowledge. Nowhere is this more true than in our understanding of nonhuman primates (NHPs). A neu- roethics committed to probing the ethical implications of brain research must be able to respond to and anticipate the challenges ahead as brain projects globally prepare to (...) increase the use of NHPs in research. This requires adopting a less anthropocentric focus that includes nonhuman animals within its scope. But the Neuroethics Roadmap represents a missed opportunity to critically examine the future direction of research with NHPs in an ethically-responsive neuroscience. (shrink)

In this chapter, I describe my “post-diagnosis” experiences as the parent of an autistic child, those years in which I tried, but failed, to make sense of the overwhelming and often nonsensical information I received about autism. I argue that immediately after being given an autism diagnosis, parents are pressured into making what amounts to a life-long commitment to a therapy program that (they are told) will not only dramatically change their child, but their family’s financial situation and even their (...) entire mode of existence. Moreover, despite information overload, many treatment programs for autism rely on empty jargon and make completely unrealistic promises, so parents are left feeling overwhelmed and panicked. Even well respected therapy programs encourage parents to spend liberally. Indeed, autistic therapists, who help construct what I refer to as the Culture of Autism, advise parents to commit to a minimum of 35 to 45 hours of intensive therapy every week. The implications are clear: for a parent who works full-time, their autistic child becomes a second full-time job. Autism is big business right now, and therapists are pushing parents to the brink of desperation. So it is not too surprising that there is a desperate cry for a more permanent solution—which is why researchers seek to cure autism. But there are two ways to conceptualize cure. A Therapeutic Cure model (TC) conceives of a cure as a beneficial treatment for the patient that eliminates or ameliorates the harms of the disease or condition. But the notion of a therapeutic cure for autism is highly implausible, given the complexities of autism. Indeed, at this point, the vast majority of researchers have come to the conclusion that the idea of a therapeutic cure for autism is simply a non-starter. Therefore the bulk of research seeking a cure for autism focuses instead on a second approach, which I refer to as the Negative Eugenics Cure model (NEC). With this model, the intention is to eliminate the disease or condition without regard for the health or well-being of the organism carrying the disease or condition. So, with regard to autism, researchers are focusing on identifying genetic markers for autism that can be detected in utero, or in embryos, so that autistic fetuses can be eliminated and autism eradicated by preventing the existence of autistic individuals. I review both models and argue that both fail to provide convincing arguments that the “solution” either offers is desirable. Both rest on the assumption that autism renders a life not worth living which, all things considered, is false. Instead of pushing to cure autism, an idea pervasive in this Culture of Autism, I contend that autistics are individuals with lives worth living. Moreover, rather than expend millions on research to search for the means to eliminate autism, we should instead expend our resources to ensure autistic individuals have access to support they may need. If the phenomenology of autism were better understood and appreciated, the panicked demand for a cure for autism might abate and perhaps autism could be seen as having value in and of its own right. (shrink)

On December 15, 2011, a final report was issued by the Committee on the Use of Chimpanzees in Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which had been convened by the U. S. Institute of Medicine (IOM) in collaboration with National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies. Within a month of its release, this report was designated by Wired Science one of the “top scientific discoveries of 2011” (Wired Science Staff 2011). The ad hoc Committee responsible for this report was formed at (...) the request of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in response to congressional inquiry that had been prompted by expressions of public concern.1 The issues addressed in the report are profoundly ethical, despite NIH’s .. (shrink)

this paper offers a critical discussion of Martial Gueroult's philosophical conception of the history of philosophy as a discipline. Gueroult was among the most influential French historians of philosophy in the twentieth century and the author of a long list of monographs on a host of modern philosophers. Gueroult's first book, on Maimon, was published in 1929, quickly followed in 1930 by a monograph on Fichte. In the English-speaking world, he is probably best known for his two-volume Descartes selon l'ordre (...) des raisons and the volumes on parts I and II of Spinoza's... (shrink)

_The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics_ offers the reader an informed view of how the brain sciences are being used to approach, understand, and reinvigorate traditional philosophical questions, as well as how those questions, with the grounding influence of neuroscience, are being revisited beyond clinical and research domains. It also examines how contemporary neuroscience research might ultimately impact our understanding of relationships, flourishing, and human nature. The _Handbook_ features easy-to-follow chapters that appear here for the first time in print and—written by (...) 61 key scholars and fresh voices—represent the wide range of viewpoints in neuroethics. The volume spotlights new technologies and historical articulations of key problems, issues, and concepts, and includes cross-referencing between chapters to highlight the complex interactions of concepts and ideas within neuroethics. These features enhance the _Handbook_’s utility by providing readers with a contextual map for different approaches to issues, and a guide to further avenues of interest. (shrink)

The Emerging Issues Task Force (Kellmeyer et al. 2019) identifies several important trends and concerns that neuroethics will encounter and grapple with in the com- ing decades. Among these are ethical issues related to the creation of new nonhuman entities, such as artificial intelligence systems, and human origin entities like brain organoids. The task force briefly mentions animal minds and animal rights, to which neuroethics to date has paid scant attention (Buller et al. 2014). As neuroscientific knowledge and knowledge from (...) other fields, including, to name a few, comparative psychology, primatology, ethology, biology, genetics, and medical sociology, accu- mulate, ethical concerns about the use of nonhuman ani- mals in research, agriculture, entertainment, and elsewhere will grow more visible and more urgent. Turning neuroethical attention toward nonhuman ani- mals also promises to illuminate issues related to specific human populations that are within the purview of a more expansive, forward-looking neuroethics. (shrink)